5. The Electronic Revolution

The Hypertext Phenomenon

In ‘reality’ – the material world – when the PNAC document was released it apparently received no reaction beyond the concentric circles in Washington; not even the media, either in the U.S. or abroad, mentioned what has been shown to be a disturbing document suggesting the use of overwhelming, unilateral military force in order to maintain pax-Americana across the globe. But, despite this, it passed through (or went around) the short-sighted corporate media. However, there was a reaction to the text and to the group, but not in the material world: this reaction occurred in cyberspace and it sent shockwaves across the digital strata. But, this is a measurable, demonstrable reaction and it is also a phenomenon that is unique to the medium and to this period in time.

The dynamics of the text, in terms of its initial production and distribution and its subsequent consumption, do not fit well with the ‘traditional’ models for text-production as they are operating within a unique environment. The most problematic area is attempting to quantify the distribution of the text within this electronic environment. One method of quantifying the distribution of the text within cyberspace is to conduct an advanced search, using keywords as listed, with the results filtered to display only those words in that syntactic sequence. As such, the results mostly constitute direct references to the group and to the document. One limitation is that these searches only take into account the Anglo-American sectors of the internet and are only representative of a cross-section of Anglo-American search engines and media outlets. There are also other groups known as PNAC such as the Pakistani National Accreditation Council and the Police National Assessment Centre which could interfere with the results.

Keywords

-

Websites

“PNAC”

“Project for the New American Century”

“Rebuilding America’s Defenses”

 

 

 

 

Google.co.uk

973,000

62,200,000

742,000

Google.com

969,000

47,000,000

734,000

Google.de

983,000

73,600,000

698,000

Google.fr

976,000

74,900,000

1,430,000

Google.es

982,000

73,700,000

1,450,000

Google.ru

978,000

73,300,000

743,000

Google.ie

974,000

72,900,000

743,000

Google.co.in

978,000

74,500,000

743,000

Google.com.pk

979,000

72,900,000

743,000

Google.cn

967,000

78,900,000

1,400,000

Google.co.jp

979,000

85,800,000

609,000

 

 

 

 

Yahoo.co.uk

1,270,000

27,100,000

1,090,000

Yahoo.com

1,270,000

26,800,000

1,080,000

 

 

 

 

Alta Vista.com

1,270,000

26,700,000

1,080,000

 

 

 

 

MSN

109,579

1,221,251

38,530

 

 

 

 

Ask.com

206,000

7,131,000

7,860

 

 

 

 

Lycos.co.uk

66,572

2,665,304

146

 

 

 

 

Excite.co.uk

204,800

7,154,000

50,200

 

 

 

 

BBC

4

182

4

CNN

-

-

-

Daily Mail

1

0

2038

Fox News

0

0

2

Guardian Unlimited

11

0

1

Independent Online

0

-

0

Reuters Online

0

57

0

Sky News – UK

0

0

0

Times Online

2

-

0

The Washington Times

0

29

6

The Washington Post

0

0

0

New York Times

0

2

38

L A Times

0

10

2

Houston Chronicle

1

123

43

The figures above demonstrate that the major Anglo-American news agencies have barely mentioned the PNAC except for the Houston Chronicle. One salient feature found in these results is that the Google search has shown that amongst the developed countries in the western world, the U.S. (47m) and Britain (62.2m), those most affiliated with the PNAC, have the least amount of reference to the group especially in comparison to France (73m) and Germany (85m). Even Google China displayed more search results than the U.S.; in fact, the U.S. displayed the least amount of results – nearly half that of Germany – when “Project for the New American Century” was searched for via U.S. based Google.com. The either suggests less interest – which given the size and activity of the U.S. is unlikely – or perhaps some form of censorship or exclusion in the search results.

The major site of reaction however – as demonstrated by the huge amount of references on the internet in general when compared to the news agencies – has been in the domain of the ‘conspiracy’ theorist. However, before investigating any further the ‘conspiracy’ theorist’s response to the PNAC document, we must examine the reconfiguration of society, power and identity in cyberspace.


Cyberpower, Identity and Community

Jordan (1999) argues that there are three levels of power in cyberspace. The first is ‘when cyberspace is understood as the playground of the individual’, or as a ‘possession an individual can use’. The second is when ‘cyberspace is understood as being a social place, a place where communities exist’ and the third is ‘when the Internet and cyberspace are understood as being a society or even a digital nation’. So power operates on the individual, social and global levels. Jordan (1999) argues that ‘cyberspace and the Internet are riven by a sociological, cultural, economic, and political battle between the individual and a technopower elite’ at all these levels. However, it must be noted that ‘cyberspace’ and the ‘internet’ are two different things, but a common misnomer and mistake is to confuse the two. The internet is only one particular ‘realm’ of cyberspace, although it is the phrase most used, the most accessible, and most likely the element of the online world that many perceive as ‘cyberspace’. There are other networks that overlap with the ‘internet’ or the word wide web such as ‘darknet’ and ‘undernet’, the telephone exchange systems, mobile communications, satellite relays – anything that can potentially carry an electronic signal. These networks are all actively used, some more than others, although it is far beyond the remit of this investigation to explore this area.

At the individual level, the user is represented by their online identity. Online identities are very different from offline identities as the user is allowed some input in the construction and portrayal of their identity whereas ‘offline’ much of this input is inferred from resources that are beyond the control of the individual. Jordan (1999) argues that this ‘prevents the use of many offline tactics for discovering identity’. But, dystopian worries aside, this enable the individual to reconstruct their identity and in doing so this also reconstructs the social-world in cyberspace. Yet the social-world is not replicated in cyber space, it is recreated. Jordan (1999) argues that ‘renovated hierarchies’ are the ‘processes through which offline hierarchies are reinvented online, with many online resources undermining offline hierarchies while also defining new hierarchies’ and that these ‘renovated hierarchies’ are in themselves ‘inherently anti-hierarchical’. He argues that ‘hierarchies are dislocated’ through ‘many-to-many communication and its ability to include people in decision making’, ‘the censorship-evading properties of the Internet’ and the inherent ‘global nature’ of the internet and cyberspace. Even ‘attempts to censor or restrict access to parts of cyberspace can often be simply bypassed’, thus ‘allowing unrestricted access to online information’ and as ‘communication from many people to many people is close to the norm in cyberspace’ this then ‘opens participation in decision making, creating the potential for conclusions to be reached in more egalitarian ways than are available offline’. In effect this creates global, networked communities of practice and the potential for social emancipation, equality and the liberalisation of knowledge, is astoundingly vast. Jordan, writing in 1999, points out this potential which has only grown in recent years as we shall see. Jordan argues:

Not only is a greater pool of expertise available, but information that governments or courts might have restricted is almost impossible to hold back once it is free in cyberspace. The global nature of cyberspace is important here, because it requires only one country connected to the Internet to allow the publication of some information and for that information to be let loose in cyberspace. Information restricted in an offline nation-state then becomes available in cyberspace, subverting the national boundaries that have helped in the past to control access to information. A global informational space undermines regional and national attempts to restrict access to information. – (Jordan, 1999: Cyberpower)

 

 

This can be demonstrated by the Torpark software (www.torrify.com) that allows users from repressive states to browse the web and engage in the online world anonymously, or the explosion of online activism and independent research that will be discussed. For example, ‘aggregators’ are increasingly used to compile relative information and to connect individuals with similar interests and pursuits. This is not only limited to My Space accounts matching people based on their favourite film, or musician, but it also effectively groups together people with similar political interests, social outlooks, moral beliefs and shared agendas. In this sense the technology is not having a detrimental effect but it is creating social-networks and communities of practice that have the ability to be beneficial to society and to the global community as a whole. Here, technology drives social change and that is, perhaps, the main thesis of this investigation.


Conspiracies: Authority and Authenticity

So within this reconfigured realm of cyberspace, the domain of the internet ‘conspiracy’ theory, or the domain of independent research in general, is undoubtedly vast and complex. It is the realm of cyber-prophets and electro-anarchists who peddle their wares beyond institutional or societal rules. The concepts they espouse span an extensive spectrum, from nothing more than popular rumours with little or no firm evidence, such as the ‘hollow earth’ theory, or arguments with substantial evidence, such as the allegations that the Bush administration had prior knowledge, or were directly involved, in the World Trade Center incident. This is why it can be argued that the tag of ‘conspiracy theory’ is somewhat ambiguous and can be quite tenuous in some instances.

The attitude towards ‘conspiracy’ theories amongst dominant groups is somewhat hostile. Jameson (1992:340) believes that the social imagination has undergone ‘widespread paralysis’ when ‘confronted with the ambitious program of fantasizing an economic system on the scale of the globe itself’, and the result is that the ‘older motif of conspiracy knows a fresh lease on life, as a narrative structure capable of reuniting the minimal basic components: a potentially infinite network’. He argues that the ‘conspiracy’ is an ‘imperfect mediatory and allegorical structure’. Jameson (1992:341-342) argues that this represents the ‘dialectical intensification of information and communication’ in which the ‘social life’ coincides ‘fully with itself’ because in the absence of the perfect utopia, the social life remains ‘contingent’ and ‘unequal’ and has to be ‘pumped back up and patched together with allegory’. Similarly, Hardt & Weeks (2004:23) argue that the ‘conspiracy’ theory ‘offers a particularly simple understanding of the totality in the sense that it tends to trace all mysteries back to a single source or power: the shadow government, the secret brotherhood of conspirators, or the evil genius’. They argue that the ‘conspiracy’ theory is ‘a poor person’s cognitive mapping’ because ‘they are so reductive and crude’. The problem is the ‘absurdity of tracing all phenomena to a single identifiable source or cause – because in reality there is no man behind the curtains who pulls the levers and controls everything’. The alternative then must be a world filled with random events, unravelled by chance, completely beyond human control. This also raises the question of ‘authenticity’ which we will return to. However, Jameson (1992:345) does believe that ‘conspiracy’ theory ‘attempts to represent… the social totality itself’ and that it represents the ‘tendential end to “civil society” in late capitalism’. Conspiracy theories do indeed reflect dissatisfaction with the status quo and alienation of a large social group but are unlikely to end ‘civil society’. The attitudes and responses to ‘conspiracy’ theories displays a rather elitist, ever domiant, attitude that presupposes it is more valuable than that which it mocks. However, elevate them, or repudiate them: the ‘conspiracy’ theorist has a large presence in cyberspace.

The PNAC and the RAD document are often associated with two dominant ‘conspiracy theories’: the first we shall refer to as the ‘Illuminati Conspiracy’ and the second as the ‘New World Order Conspiracy’ – the latter being a modern reiteration of the former. The clause that appears in numerous ‘conspiracy’ theories, specifically alternative theories regarding the World Trade Center incident, appears on page 51 (PNAC, 2000) of the original document. The statement is as follows:

‘Further, the process of transformation, even if it brings revolutionary change, is likely to be a long one, absent some catastrophic and catalyzing event – like a new Pearl Harbor’

It is then understandable that many independent researchers link this statement with the World Trade Center incident as that event was indeed ‘catastrophic’ and ‘catalysing’ in the sense that it became the fundamental pretext for the ‘War on Terror’ and the illegal invasions of both Afghanistan and Iraq. These are also ‘simultaneous major theater wars’ as the document first outlined as one of its ‘four core missions’ (PNAC, 2000:iv).

The root of this conspiracy lies perhaps with the ‘Illuminati’. The narrative for the Illuminati ‘conspiracy’ theory, to be very brief, is as follows: the Knights Templar uncovered ‘secret’ knowledge beneath Solomon’s Temple in the middle ages and they hid this from society before their persecution by the Vatican. A society in possession of this knowledge was established during the Renaissance known as the Illuminati – the illuminated ones - who, after de-stabilising the European monarchy, emigrated to the new world and established their secret government amongst the cabal of Stone-Masons already established there to create a ‘shadow government’ that would eventually rule the world (Hardt & Weeks, 2004:23). The esoteric traditions of the elite American Universities such as the ‘Skull and Bones’ fraternity at Yale[1], or the participation by political figures in the ‘Cremation of Care’ ceremony at Camp David[2] – which involves offering a burned effigy to the Canaanite owl god Molloch – have inflated these claims in the modern age. Of course, this also correlates with the long-standing tradition of Stone Masons in Britain and Europe, as well as various secretive groups that have previously influenced world affairs, such as the Thule Society which helped promote and fund the NSDAP in Germany.

The New World Order ‘conspiracy’ is similar although it allocates power to the military-industrial complex and the oil industry rather than a shadowy group with ‘secret knowledge’. It can be argued, though, that the New World Order ‘conspiracists’ are very closely aligned with contemporary social researchers. This may seem like a ridiculous proposition but the thesis here is that conceptually there is very little difference between the two, with the only variable being language, or for our purposes, discourse. For example, the ‘conspiracy’ theorists also frequently use the term ‘sheeple’[3]: an idea which, however derogatorily, expresses a multitude of theoretical concepts such as false-consciousness, homogeneity and hegemony. The researchers involved in these investigations do not use academic conventions, cite appropriate frameworks and methodologies, and in most cases, they do not cite any credentials or recognised expertise. However, they are engaged in the same practices and adhering, however haphazardly, to the same frameworks, concepts and methodologies as the dominant group, in this case the traditional institutions and government agencies. The only difference is in the discourse practices that they are engaged in. For example, another facet of the ‘conspiracy theory’, particularly those related the United States, is the use of, often quite complex, semiotic analyses of various forms of symbolism. This ranges from the analyses of iconography, to architecture and ordinance. For instance, one of the key arguments that binds the Illuminati theory is the appearance of Masonic and esoteric symbols on currency, in Government agencies, corporate logos and national emblems. An example would be the eye of Horus atop the un-capped pyramid on the $1 bill with the phrase ‘Novus Ordo Seclorum’ beneath the image. This correlates with the oft cited speech made by George H.W. Bush to a Joint Session of Congress on September 11th 1990[4] in which the former President continually referred to the coming ‘new world order’. In fact, Bush uses the phrase twice: once in the opening (‘out of these troubled times, our fifth objective – a new world order – can emerge: a new era — freer from the threat of terror’) and finally to close (‘[Americans] serve together with Arabs, Europeans, Asians, and Africans in defense of principle and the dream of a new world order’).

However, one facet of this power struggle is representative of ‘class-consciousness’ and resultant ‘class conflict’: individuals are aware of an elite, dominant group, of a hierarchical social order, and of a world that is seemingly beyond their control. The discourse type of the ‘conspiracy’ theory reacts against this. Bourdieu (1991:128-130) expresses this idea as ‘heretical discourse’, which is discourse that ‘exploits the possibility of changing the social world by changing the representation of this world which contributes to its reality’. Bourdieu (1991:129) argues that this represents the need ‘to externalise the inwardness, to name the unnamed and to give the beginnings of objectification to pre-verbal and pre-reflexive dispositions and ineffable, and unobservable experiences’ but, more importantly, this externalisation is achieved through ‘words which by their nature make them common and communicable, therefore meaningful and socially sanctioned.’ Although perhaps the term ‘heretical discourse’ is more applicable to those emergent discourse types that reproduce extremist ideologies or attempt to cause controversy with highly politicised agendas that would not necessarily contribute to a progressive society. But, these ideologies, however unpalatable or unbelievable, must exist in ovo in the first place for them to be expressed through discourse; in fact, the expression through discourse is necessary to the initial realisation. This demonstrates that, to a great extent, authority is distributed by and through discourse. The discourse types of the dominant group are given preference, authority and credibility over the discourse types of the majority group, as the majority group is less powerful. For instance, the media, the ‘official’ spokesperson, the politician, even the actor, or the singer, are given preference because they are favoured by the existing social order as they seek to only replicate the existing social-order. Attempting to change the existing social order can result in a form of inarticulation. By engaging in the discourse types of the dominant group, there is the risk of alienating the majority group and so little chance of altering the existing social order, but the very real danger of replicating the existing social order by engaging in, and proliferating, the discourse types of the dominant group. As Bourdieu (1991:129) argues: any discourse type ‘authorizes what it designates at the same time as it expresses it’. The same is true of this investigation: the sarcophagus of academia means that this discussion must engage in the dominant discourse type – that of an academic essay – and so it is reproducing the very thing that it is trying to resist. Conversely, engaging in the vernacular discourse types of the majority group, in this case the ‘conspiracy theorists’, connects with the majority group but is under whelmed because it lacks the capital of the discourse types of the dominant group.

This then, raises the problem of ‘authenticity’ which is implicitly connected with authority. Adorno (1964:100-101) argues (in response to Heidegger) that the ‘pre-terminological use of “authentic” underlined what was essential, in contrast to what was accidental’ but now, in post-modernity: ‘the interest in the authenticity of a concept enters into the judgement about this concept… whatever is authentic in this concept also becomes so only under the perspective of something that is different from it’. In this sense, the ‘authentic’ has become the idealised utopian paradigm by which all else must be judged, or, in other terms: the ‘authentic’ is that which is imbued with the authority of the dominant group because it seeks to reproduce or improve the conditions of reproduction of the dominant group: the ‘authentic’ is the pre-authorised.


Summary

So, to summarise this point: effecting social change has been rendered difficult because the discourse types of each group have been valued and commodified, with those that suit the dominant group being given preference and authority over those that are marginal, even if they do reside with the majority. Although, it can be argued that in cyberspace these traditional roles break down and are reconfigured. As Jordan (1999) argued: these hierarchies are renovated. In cyberspace the vernacular discourse types are the dominant agents. In cyberspace, power is reconfigured.

Jordan (1999) believes that ‘power is the condition and limit of politics, culture, and authority’ and that ‘cyberpower aims not at the immediately obvious forms of politics, culture, and authority that course through cyberspace but at the structures that condition and limit these’, in every sense, at the state apparatuses themselves. He argues that ‘cyberpower points not to the ultimate dominance of the elite, although it clearly identifies the burgeoning power of an elite, nor does it predict the libertarian ideal of individual empowerment, although it makes conspicuous the ongoing creation of powers for individuals in cyberspace’ but that it points to the ‘roar of battle’ between these two extremes.

 

NEXT PAGE>>> 


[1] CBS News.com, June 14th 2004: Skull and Bones.

[2] Prison Planet.com, 2007: Bohemian Grove

[3] Urban Dictionary.com, 2007: Sheeple

[4] Bush, G.H.W., 1990. Address Before a Joint Session of Congress (September 11, 1990).


Leave a Reply